3.5 Discourse as a point of reference for ethical behaviour

An ethic of duty based on the principle of reason can be very helpful in principle. However, it is also confronted with problems, especially when many values clash and claim validity. This becomes obvious in the societal debates and discourses on a wide variety of controversial topics. It is therefore worth taking a brief look at contemporary approaches on discourse ethics, one of the best-known representatives of which is Jürgen Habermas (*1929). This type of ethics attaches structuring weight to argumentation in pluralistic, non-traditional and modern societies. However, discourse ethics is not about techniques on how to properly engage in a discourse in order to be justified in the end. Rather - as with Kant - it is about "giving an answer to the question of what we should orientate our actions towards in every situation" In this sense, discourse ethics can be understood as a modification of Kant's ethics, whereby it also constitutes an ethics of duty.

Instead of reason (as with Kant), in discourse ethics the rational consent of all participants in an unconstrained discourse free of domination takes precedence. Ethical action then means nothing less than "that one should always act in such a way that all rational beings (and especially all those potentially affected by the behaviour) could agree to the chosen principle of action in an unlimited argumentative discourse". It is about an argumentatively mediated understanding of norms and courses of action that all participants can reasonably recognise. This means that discourse ethics is based on an ideal discourse and ideal conditions; a prerequisite that cannot be found in practice. Discourse ethics can provide valuable impulses for analysing the ethical question "What should I do?".

Example

In order to shed a light on her problematic situation, our sustainability officer would have to consider, from the perspective of discourse ethics, which of her options for action can be considered acceptable for all those affected, but also, in principle, for all people. She would therefore also have to consider the arguments of those people who are affected by the potential environmental damage caused by the colleague who disregarded the relevant regulations. And even if the arguments of this very colleague should be heard, it is difficult to imagine that the cover-up of his behavior would meet with general approval in a (theoretically) domination-free and unrestrained course without any influence of power.