2.6 Relativisim

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Ethics reflects on and scrutinises current morals and values. It looks for good reasons to formulate commandments or prohibitions for actions that are considered ethically desirable. Now, one could argue that ideas about what constitutes good behaviour differ from society to society, for example by pointing to cultural differences. Is it possible to make an ethical judgement and refer to something good or bad in general terms without considering the particular circumstances of a community, the era in which it exists and the cultural characteristics it has developed? Is there any central moment in ethics that is non-relative and can be binding across time and epochs?
 
We shall first approach the answer from the other side. We know that there are different morals. Let us assume that all moral concepts are relative and that the ethical reflection and theory that are developed from them largely confirmed morality. Then nothing could be labelled unambiguously good or unambiguously bad. This idea in turn has consequences. For if, for example, "another epoch approves of the deeds and intentions of Hitler and Stalin, there is not even hypothetically an authority that can oppose this value judgement. All that remains is: some have seen atrocities in these deeds others have not."<ref><small>Manstetten (2005) <cite page="94"  id="675ad0b3500f8">Ma05</cite></small></ref> One could therefore ignore it on the grounds that it is their values and as long as we are not affected, it is none of our business. If a conflict arose, there would be no basis for mutual understanding of the communities and ultimately the (militarily) strongest community enforced which moral concepts apply, and that is it.
 
Irrespective of the judgement that we cannot want such a world, we can also put forward theoretical arguments against a moral "anything goes" and ignoring it on the one hand and against the primitive right of the strongest on the other. Irrespective of the judgement that we cannot want such a world, we can also put forward theoretical arguments against a moral "anything goes" and ignoring it on the one hand and against the primitive right of the strongest on the other. This is because the objection of relativism only applies to the variable content of morality, for example living according to the principle of monogamy or polygamy. However, there is also an invariable formal aspect to morality or ethics, for example living according to the principle of universally acting well. This invariable principle transcends morals and does not finally merge into a specific moral. To a certain extent, it is a search process whose driving force is the unconditional will to do good, the morality of a person. In morality and its embedded principle of freedom lies the motivation to arrive at ever better and more humane standards and, as a result, ethically better value and moral systems.
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<small>From: Pieper (2017) <cite page="42"  id="675ad0b3500fd">Pi17</cite>, authors‘ translation</small>
 
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Was also zunächst als bloße Relativität erscheint, erweist sich bei näherem Zusehen als die aufgrund unterschiedlicher sozio-kultureller Randbedingungen voneinander abweichende Ausprägung eines Freiheitsverständnisses, das sich in gemeinsamen Basisnormen, wie Gerechtigkeit, Gleichheit, Humanität etc. artikuliert.
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What initially appears to be mere relativity turns out, on closer inspection, to be the divergent manifestation of freedom due to different socio-cultural conditions, which is articulated in common basic norms such as justice, equality, humanity, etc. [...].
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Revision as of 14:01, 12 December 2024

Ethics reflects on and scrutinises current morals and values. It looks for good reasons to formulate commandments or prohibitions for actions that are considered ethically desirable. Now, one could argue that ideas about what constitutes good behaviour differ from society to society, for example by pointing to cultural differences. Is it possible to make an ethical judgement and refer to something good or bad in general terms without considering the particular circumstances of a community, the era in which it exists and the cultural characteristics it has developed? Is there any central moment in ethics that is non-relative and can be binding across time and epochs?

We shall first approach the answer from the other side. We know that there are different morals. Let us assume that all moral concepts are relative and that the ethical reflection and theory that are developed from them largely confirmed morality. Then nothing could be labelled unambiguously good or unambiguously bad. This idea in turn has consequences. For if, for example, "another epoch approves of the deeds and intentions of Hitler and Stalin, there is not even hypothetically an authority that can oppose this value judgement. All that remains is: some have seen atrocities in these deeds others have not."[1] One could therefore ignore it on the grounds that it is their values and as long as we are not affected, it is none of our business. If a conflict arose, there would be no basis for mutual understanding of the communities and ultimately the (militarily) strongest community enforced which moral concepts apply, and that is it.

Irrespective of the judgement that we cannot want such a world, we can also put forward theoretical arguments against a moral "anything goes" and ignoring it on the one hand and against the primitive right of the strongest on the other. Irrespective of the judgement that we cannot want such a world, we can also put forward theoretical arguments against a moral "anything goes" and ignoring it on the one hand and against the primitive right of the strongest on the other. This is because the objection of relativism only applies to the variable content of morality, for example living according to the principle of monogamy or polygamy. However, there is also an invariable formal aspect to morality or ethics, for example living according to the principle of universally acting well. This invariable principle transcends morals and does not finally merge into a specific moral. To a certain extent, it is a search process whose driving force is the unconditional will to do good, the morality of a person. In morality and its embedded principle of freedom lies the motivation to arrive at ever better and more humane standards and, as a result, ethically better value and moral systems.

Cita­tion

From: Pieper (2017) Pi17, p. 42, authors‘ translation

What initially appears to be mere relativity turns out, on closer inspection, to be the divergent manifestation of freedom due to different socio-cultural conditions, which is articulated in common basic norms such as justice, equality, humanity, etc. [...].

  1. Manstetten (2005) Ma05, p. 94