The imperative of responsibility

he widely known work "The Imperative of Responsibility" by the German-American philosopher Hans Jonas (1903 - 1993) has decisively expanded the discussion on responsibility. Published in 1979, his discussion of responsibility reflects on the technical and nuclear possibilities for the destruction of humanity that emerged in the 20th century. The principle of responsibility thematises nothing less than human existence in its entirety and in general. It expands the concepts of responsibility that had been established until then. Due to the technical possibilities that humans have developed, they have the power to destroy themselves and the earth. In other words, humans are in a position to extinguish all life on earth. This creates a responsibility that goes far beyond the basic question structure of "Who (subject) is responsible for what (object) and to whom (authority)?".

Example

The responsibility that arises in this context has a different quality than the responsibility for roles that a mining professional has towards her employer, for example. It also has a different quality than the moral responsibility of a HR-head in a mining company who, with reference to human dignity, defies an acquaintance working for a head hunter and refuses to share details of the company’s mining professionals.

A few theoretical considerations are required to clarify this new quality.

The imperative of responsibility is based on human existence and thus also on the conditions for responsibility in general. In order to speak meaningfully of responsibility, human existence must be presupposed. Without existence, one could say, there is no responsibility. Conversely, however, one could also say: without responsibility (in the sense of: without acting responsibly) no existence. Because due to its immense technological possibilities, man has the power to extinguish the existence of human life. And it is clear: "The demands of responsibility grow in proportion to the deeds of power".

With this conception of responsibility, the object (for what?) and the authority (towards whom?) of responsibility fall into one. This means that we, as subjects of our actions, are responsible both for human existence (object) and towards human existence (authority). In addition, the previous "anthropocentric monopoly of most former ethical systems" is broken through. For in the earlier ethical systems, it was the interests and rights of humans that were to be respected by ethical behaviour. In principle, these ethical duties towards humans retain their validity. "But now the whole biosphere of the planet with all its plenitude of species, newly revealed in its vulnerability to man’s excessive intervention, claims its share of the respect owed to all that is an end in itself–that is: to all that is alive.“

It is life, the living itself, that has become the focus of responsibility. It is no longer just man with his interests. It is no longer only man who is an end in himself; in the imperative of responsibility, nature is now also recognised as an end in itself. Understood in this way, nature is no longer a mere disposable mass for man to intervene in according to his interests. Nature is an end in itself. It is no longer a mere means to man's end. "As a planetary power of the first rank, he [man, author's note] can no longer think only of himself." In the imperative of responsibility, man is responsible to nature, he is in a sense (theoretically) accountable to it. In the most fundamental sense, man is thus responsible for ensuring that responsibility is further possible. The imperative of responsibility places responsibility at the centre of our actions and is also the prerequisite for responsibility in general. Without nature, without existence, without humanity, the notion of responsibility makes no sense. Where there is nothing, nothing can or needs to be taken responsibility for. In short, we are responsible for the conditions of existence, i.e. for nature.

It is quite obvious that mining affects the landscape and hence human life and nature. Thus it is probably not far-fetched to conclude that from an ethical consideration mining bears responsibility for existence (of nature and mankind). With the arguments of Hans Jonas and the imperative of responsibility, which is still effective today, it is only a small (argumentative) step to also consider dignity for nature. Especially in connection with Kant's insights, which flow into the concept of human dignity, the following applies: "What has a price can also be replaced by something else as an equivalent; what, on the other hand, is above all price, and therefore does not allow for an equivalent, has a dignity.". If one follows the imperative of responsibility, according to which nature bears its purpose in itself, then one would logically have to ascribe at least an intrinsic value to nature as a whole, of which humans are a part. In the case of the destruction of nature and all life, there would no longer be an equivalent that could be put in its place. There would be no price to pay except that of annihilation itself. The conceptual proximity to dignity, at least in the sense of an end in itself, thus appears to be given.