3.2.4 Case Study I: Brumadinho Dam Break

The catastrophic failure of the Brumadinho Dam I in 2019 led to major loss of life and environmental damage in Brazil. The dam was operated by Vale, a Brazilian mining company, which had chosen an upstream tailings dam design because it was comparatively cheaper to build, quicker to raise, and easier to license. In upstream dams, previously deposited tailings (partially dried or crusted) are used as the foundation for each new raise, increasing the height and storage capacity over the years. This is in contrast to downstream dams, where new raises are built outward on engineered, compacted fill such as sand, gravel, and clay, rather than on the tailings themselves (Silva Rotta et al., 2020).

After reaching its final height in 2015, Dam I was declared inactive by Vale. In the following years, it was positively assessed on dam safety, and in September of 2018, TÜV Süd’s Brazilian subsidiary issued an independent stability certification. Four months later, Dam I collapsed, and masses of mining waste, “equivalent to a 10-m high wave of mud that spread 10 km downhill” (Silva Rotta et al., 2020, p. 2), killed at least 270 people. The dam break furthermore led to the immediate destruction of forests and agricultural areas, water contamination, and soil and land degradation (Filho et al., 2023), producing multi-faceted damages to local communities such as fishermen (Ferreira et al., 2024).

One of the great dangers of tailings dams in general—but upstream dams in particular—is seepage, the slow movement of water through the dam that often carries fine particles with it. Researchers followed this hypothesis and came to the following conclusion:

The time series analysis of satellite-driven soil moisture index showed that the water accumulated over the Brumadinho dam surface during a protracted period increased its moisture contents and accelerated seepage erosion (piping) through the fill. We provide solid evidence of the seepage erosion from the top through the fill, which chronically weakened the structure and likely led to the collapse of the dam.

Silva Rotta et al., 2020, p. 11

But how could a catastrophe like this happen, especially when the dam’s safety was independently assessed shortly before the break and continuously examined by the company itself? After Vale quickly declared they had no idea of the safety issues, journalistic reports indicated that the company had been repairing leaks in the dam months before the collapse (Philips, 2019). Later in 2019, it became public that internal documents suggested that Vale was aware of the risk of collapse (Eisenhammer, 2019). According to a congressional report on the disaster, Vale’s then-Chief Executive Officer furthermore received an anonymous warning via an internal email only weeks before the collapse (Plumb, 2019). The BBC reported that documents and internal emails gave proof to the investigators that TÜV Süd was also aware of the safety issues (Hill, 2019). The company is said to have changed its approach to assessment to award a certification to the dam, while at the same time employees attempted to communicate the issues via internal channels.

Vale has already paid $7bn in a settlement between the company and the government of Minas Gerais that, however, does not resolve criminal responsibility. No final criminal verdict or conviction has been universally delivered—Vale, TÜV Süd, and 16 individuals are defendants being charged with aggravated homicide (270 counts), crimes against flora and fauna, as well as pollution. As of December 2025, the case is still under investigation. Today, it is assumed that the fatalities could have been reduced by a warning, even one issued only at the time the dam failed (Lumbroso, 2021), while researchers discuss and further develop predictive models (Sieira et al., 2024).

Beyond the engineering and regulatory failures, the case also reveals dramatic breakdowns in ethical reporting and whistleblowing systems. The internal reporting systems at Vale as well as TÜV Süd were either not in place or failed dramatically. Furthermore, employees did not fully initiate an “escalation spiral” (Herold, 2022, p. 63) that would have led from the fruitless attempts to report internally to external whistleblowing or even public disclosure of the safety issues. The anonymous email to the CEO of Vale could be interpreted as a rather desperate attempt by an employee caught between their loyalty toward the company and the public.

Potential reasons for the failure of reporting systems can be found among many stakeholders at different levels. On an individual level, potential whistleblowers have to fear severe reprisals, which might have stopped the aforementioned escalation. Companies like Vale, on an organizational level, are under systemic pressure to reduce costs, which can be fatal when it comes to tasks like maintenance. For TÜV Süd, it is reported that the company was worried about their contracts with Vale in case of a failed certification (Hill, 2019). On the political level, there is also some responsibility within the legal framework and its enforcement, which is why the Brumadinho disaster sparked debates about environmental regulation (e.g., Munhoz, 2019).

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